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The following questions may have an air of both familiarity and 
unfamiliarity for those who work within the tradition of modern European 
philosophy: 1) What if pots, pans, pliers and setsquares fell from the skies? 2) 
What if we have property in our own person? 3) What if people were simple 
enough to believe the first person who put a spade into the ground and said 
“this is mine”? 4) What if we are not in full possession of ourselves? 5) What 
if there is nothing, not a single thing, that is in possession of itself? These five 
questions trace a trajectory within the last five hundred years of modern 
European philosophy guided by a desire to understand - and also to halt - the 
steady encroachment of things. As we shall see, it is a trajectory that begins 
and ends in uncertainty. However, for most of the five hundred years it has 
been weaving its way through the Western canon of modern European 
thought those that defined this trajectory were guided by one deeply held 
certainty: if we don’t possess ourselves, then the world of things will come to 
possess us. Indeed, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that one of the 
key problems that defines the “modern” in modern European thought is the 
problem of possession.  
This is not a new thought; it first appears in the work of C.B. Macpherson 
and in particular his interpretation of early modern English political thought, 
The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke.1 Hobbes, 
Harrington, Locke; all were driven by a shared belief in the self-possession of 
the individual person, a belief that both gave rise to deeply radical forms of 
liberalism that unhooked patriarchy and slavery from their allegedly 
naturalist bases and that also wove the idea of private property into the very 
fabric of the person, engendering and legitimating massive inequalities ever 
since. As Joseph Carens neatly summarises Macpherson’s position: “The 
possessive individualist version of democracy denies and conceals the 
oppression and class domination inherent in a society based upon private – 
and unequal – property.”2 But Macpherson’s analyses and diagnoses only 
captured part of a bigger picture. Historically, they did not reach back into 
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Renaissance concerns with “the vanities” that shaped so many of the key 
themes of modernity but nor did they connect forward, so to speak, to the 
problem of possession that guided the philosophers of suspicion; Nietzsche, 
Marx and Freud.3 One of the consequences of this latter omission is that 
Macpherson did little to interrogate the grounds of his own position, such that 
he didn’t reflect deeply enough upon the idea that his own socialist critique 
of liberalism was thoroughly reliant upon the same notions of self-possession 
and possessiveness that were the target of his critique.4 But is it possible to 
find a way of framing the problem of possession without falling back into 
partial and un-reflexive gestures? Moreover, if we can find a better way of 
framing this problem then the stakes are high: we can rethink the “modern” 
in modern European thought and, in doing so, we may, perhaps, find our way 
out of “the culture of possession” that sustains the “cultures of consumption” 
that shape our contemporary lives.5 A broader and deeper analysis of the 
problem may mean that there is a chance to think and to live after possession. 
A seemingly unlikely text to turn to in this regard is Tristan Garcia’s Form 
and Object: A Treatise on Things.6 It is unlikely because the text has been 
presented, to Anglophone readers at least, as a work of systematic philosophy 
that is a part of the contemporary turn away from the parochial concerns of 
modern critical theory.7 Nonetheless, in the following discussion, I shall 
explicate and defend four claims that bring it back into contact with this 
critical tradition: 1) that Garcia’s Form and Object can be read, profitably, 
within this tradition of reflection upon the nature of possessions, self-
possession and possessiveness; 2) that to read the book in this way is to see 
Garcia as the French heir to McPherson although it will be argued that what 
this amounts to is that while McPherson was the anti-Locke, so to speak, 
Garcia is the anti-Rousseau; 3) that this framing has significant consequences 
for our reception of Form and Object in that it can be understood as a book that 
not only marks a moment in debates surrounding speculative realism and 
object oriented ontology but that it also, and primarily, marks an important 
moment in debates about the encroachment of things and the culture of 
possession that, in part, defines modernity; 4) that there is a novel ontological 
position within Form and Object, one that is neither relational nor individualist, 
that presents a challenging account of “the chance and the price” of living 
after possession and how to overcome the deleterious effects of contemporary 
consumer societies.  
In order to make sense of these claims, I will sketch out the trajectory of 
thought oriented by the problem of possession within which, as will be 
argued, we can locate Garcia’s book. I will then demarcate what I take to be 
the central problem addressed by Garcia - under the conceptual banner of 
“the compact” or the “principle of compactness” - and consider how his 
analyses decisively reorient the problem of possession through his 
controversial yet perceptive discussion of the nature of things and objects. 
What is at stake, I will argue, is whether or not we can conceive of a critique 
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of possessiveness that does not rely upon either a relational or an 
individualistic ontology. In the end, it will be concluded that Garcia’s own 
cautious, uncertain approach offers a compelling vision of both the price we 
may pay by giving up on self-ownership and the chance that may be afforded 
us if we have the courage to think after possession.  
The Problem of Possession: The First Four Questions 
In his Garcian Meditations, Jon Cogburn introduces Garcia’s particular 
brand of realism by way of a “Whig history” that enables us to situate it within 
“dialectical space” in order to get a “sense of what is at stake.”8 It is a similar 
gesture that orients this discussion, even though the dialectical space is 
construed differently. Where Cogburn begins his Whig history with Plato’s 
myth of the cave in order to demarcate philosophy’s perennial concern with 
the competing claims of realism and idealism so as to situate Garcia’s text as 
an important contribution to this debate, I shall draw a more local or limited 
historical frame, that of the modern concern with the rise of things and their 
seeming capacity to dominate human life. In doing so, I do not disagree with 
Cogburn’s framing of Garcia’s contribution; indeed, much of what I will draw 
upon in the following discussion is deeply indebted to his insightful reading 
of Garcia’s contribution as a metaphysician. However, as will become 
apparent as this discussion unfolds, framing Garcia’s project as a contribution 
to modern European thought does allow us to focus on elements of his work 
that Cogburn’s presentation does not foreground. Namely, we can profitably 
read Garcia’s Form and Object as concerned with the problem of possession 
that has run through modern European thought and therefore consider it as a 
(perhaps surprising) book of critical theory, without diminishing its 
ostensible metaphysical project (so ably interrogated by Cogburn). This 
framing, a more critically oriented Whig history, can be given by considering 
the dialectical trajectory contained within the first four questions set out 
above.  
Question 1: What if pots, pans, pliers and setsquares fell from the skies? 
And more: bellows, rakes, stools, ladders, bagpipes and many unidentified 
objects. This question is inspired by Leonardo da Vinci’s work, A Cloudburst 
of Material Possessions, drawn circa 1510-13.9 This image is a startling 
demonstration of the Renaissance concern with the rapidly expanding world 
of things, tools, objects, possessions. But it is not clear what is at stake. Some 
years before this sketch, Savoranola had decisively come down on the side of 
the modest man in his “bonfire of the vanities”: an unambiguous defence of 
the necessary relationship of modesty to Godliness.10 In his sketch, da Vinci 
is much less certain about what it is that is happening in the world of things, 
what it is doing to us, and what we may do in return. The objects are typically 
tools, functional objects, not Savoranola’s “luxuries”; the objects are falling 
from the sky to earth rather than being burned on the earth to return them to 
the sky; there are no people crushed by this cloudburst; the whole thing seems 
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to suggest an orderliness that speaks of the clash of naturalism and 
mechanism rather than earthliness and Godliness; it is an impersonal invasion 
of the functional object and thus unclear what the human response to it could 
possibly be; no bonfire of these tools, it seems, would ever halt the downpour. 
Da Vinci’s subtlety is his uncertainty; this drawing catches a glimpse of the 
emergent world of modern capitalist economies, where our relationship to the 
functional objects that have made us able to build both palaces and hovels 
will no longer make sense, where they are no longer simply objects “for us” 
but objects that will simply rain down upon us. 
Question 2: But what if we already have property in our own person? 
This Lockean question continues the errant line of this Whig history by virtue 
of providing the first properly philosophical response to da Vinci’s cloudburst 
of material possessions.11 By the time of his Second Treatise on Government, 
Locke’s 17th Century Europe was beginning to feel the political shock waves 
of the rise of possessions: a whole class of people who felt that their 
possessions were theirs alone, inalienably, and not the property of the 
Monarch. But the new political language of consent was not enough to secure 
these possessions; another route had to be found.12 In one of the most 
dramatic twists of modern political theory, Locke declared that we already 
have property in our own person, that we therefore own what we do with our 
person, our labour, and that whatever we mix our labour with is rightfully 
ours. The cloudburst of material possessions could be harvested, channelled 
and turned into ever more possessions; simply pick up whatever nature has 
bequeathed and by virtue of having mixed your labour with it, it is your 
private property, by right, inalienably. The uncertainty of da Vinci’s sketch is 
replaced, therefore, with Locke’s certainty in our own self-possession and 
certainty therefore in our ability to reap the rewards of the cloudburst, at least 
for those emergent bourgeois that were hard working enough and endowed 
of the right spirit. 
Question 3: What if people were simple enough to believe the first person 
who put a spade into the ground and said “this is mine”? It was already clear 
– for Savonarola but also for some of Locke’s contemporaries, the puritans, 
for example – that legitimating the rampant accumulation of material 
possessions could have disastrous effects on social harmony. Yet, if burning 
the possessions was not the answer, and if simply denying oneself these 
possessions in the name of purity was not going to stop others from their 
accumulation, then how could the negative effects of possessiveness be 
overcome? It was Rousseau, in his “Discourse On the Origins and 
Foundations of Inequality Among Mankind,” who diagnosed the problem of 
possessiveness and its resolution in genuinely social terms.13 The problem 
arose when the noble savages were simple enough to allow one of their kind 
to say “this is mine” and so the problem had to be addressed by a properly 
general act of will that would bring people back together in a conscious 
harmony of ends, one in which the institution of private property was 
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thoroughly subordinate to those ends. By agreeing with each that we will do 
what is best for all rather than simply for those that possess property we will 
create a new political body in which each member is indivisible from the 
whole; a true social compact.14 This compact he defines as the total alienation 
of individual rights to the whole community; only then will the division and 
inequality brought about by the cloudburst of material possessions be held in 
check, not by the self-possession of the industrious bourgeois but by the total 
possession of all within the compact forged through the general will. 
It seemed that these two forms of self-possession were the only way to 
respond to the cloudburst of material possessions: the self-possession of the 
individual and the self-possession of the community (and in many respects 
these two options still define our available responses to “cultures of 
consumerism”). Of course, both are responses “on the side of the subject,” so 
to speak. Whatever else divided Locke and Rousseau, they agreed that the 
world of things, of possessions, required a completely self-possessed subject 
(individual or community) in order to control rather than be controlled by 
possessions.  
Question 4: But what if we humans are not in full possession of 
ourselves? This was the question raised by the three great Victorian “masters 
of suspicion,” to use Paul Ricoeur’s phrase: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud (and 
of course we could add the fourth, Darwin, though his project was less guided 
by “suspicion”).15 Each of these thinkers gave us reason to be suspicious of 
complete self-possession – either individual or collective. Perhaps the 
development of modes of production was out of our conscious control; 
perhaps we were driven by slavish resentments that we never realised; 
perhaps our desires never let us possess ourselves completely? This was the 
right line of inquiry, a line that pushed at the limits of our certainty about self-
possession in the search for a world after possession. And yet, each of these 
thinkers failed to step over the limits that they nonetheless recognized as 
constitutive of our deeply problematic relationship with possessions, because 
they each remained wedded, in the end, to the promise of a subjective 
resolution to come.  
The Problem of Possession: The Fifth Question 
One reason we know that the masters of suspicion never crossed this 
limit is that we now understand at least one of the questions to ask when it is 
truly crossed: what if nothing, not a single thing, is in possession of itself? This 
question is at the heart of Form and Object; to which I shall now turn. 
Garcia begins Form and Object with a cautious statement: “Our time is 
perhaps the time of an epidemic of things.”16 It is a time that reaches back to 
da Vinci’s and it is a time he, da Vinci, might recognize. According to Garcia, 
there is “a kind of ‘thingly’ contamination of the present” and a 
“desubstantialisation” of things.17 But it also a time that Locke would 
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acknowledge, a time of the “industrialisation of production,” and even 
Rousseau could embrace Garcia’s opening appeal to the fact that this 
contamination is hard to comprehend “without suffering from it.”18 And most 
assuredly, the masters of suspicion would dwell on Garcia’s insistence that 
resisting this epidemic with all the usual means ready to hand is pointless, “a 
waste of time and effort.”19  
And yet, even from the opening lines there is an air of difference about 
Garcia’s ruminations, something that speaks to the problem of possession but 
that does so in an original way. On the one hand, he speaks of an epidemic – 
things have some capacity to get inside of us and infect us like a virus, which 
immediately forces the uneasy thought that whatever we think is the 
difference between us and things it is not as clear cut as we typically presume. 
Just as the biologist can venture an organic continuity between humans and 
our viral co-existents, so Garcia seeks to establish a continuum between 
humans and things such that he proposes “a new model of the division of 
things – of things around us, of things in us, and of us among things.”20 On 
the other hand, the epidemic is “an epidemic of things,” those abstracted 
metaphysical entities that we know, for many, are the most basic entities of 
all. How can such seemingly metaphysical and abstract entities infect us at all, 
and to such epidemic proportions that it defines our time? For Garcia, one of 
the key reasons for this is that we are not only things that think, but our 
thinking is itself a thing: “we must understand that by initially thinking about 
things we are not prevented from conceiving of our thought, language and 
knowledge as things equal to things thought, said and known.”21 Garcia’s 
opening framing of his project in Form and Object, therefore, already stakes out 
new ground for thinking about this epidemic, the ground being a maximally 
flat ontology of things.  
The idea of a flat ontology – an ontological scheme in which there is no 
formal hierarchy between entities, which therefore attributes “an equal 
ontological dignity to each individuated thing”22 – has become commonplace 
in many of the recent discussions around new materialism, speculative 
realism and object oriented ontologies.23 Although Harman notes that “this 
sort of ‘flat ontology’ has been familiar since the time of Alexius Meinong,”24 
Garcia credits Manuel DeLanda’s “rereading of Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy” 
with the “idea of a ‘flat ontology’.”25 But where Meinong and Deleuze (and 
DeLanda) have faltered, Garcia seeks to tread confidently towards the 
“central claim” that “no classical determination – including the property of 
being non-contradictory, of being individuated, or of having identity or unity 
– is contained in our concept of the most unrestricted, emptiest thing and in 
the most formal possibility of a ‘thing’.”26 He goes on: “we consider as 
inessential all that may characterise a thing until we have properly identified 
what defines it as a thing, and not as a consistent thing, individual thing, or one 
thing. We thus aim…at the being of de-determined things.”27 The sheer reach 
of this claim is evident if we recall that Garcia’s “things” not only include 
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those conventional things, the number of which is rising to epidemic 
proportions “in our time,” but also that which is “thought, said and known.” 
That the latter may not be consistent, individuated or “one” is a challenge for 
even the flattest of flat ontologies. 
Cogburn has presented the most compelling account of just how flat 
Garcia’s flat ontology really is when he considers it in the context of Harman’s 
characterisation of speculative realism.28 For Harman, speculative realists 
either reject the idea that “human-world” relations stand at the center of 
philosophy or the claim that all knowledge is finite and therefore unable to 
grasp reality in its own right.29 He aligns himself with the former but not the 
latter. But as Cogburn argues, Garcia rejects both claims: the human-world 
relation is not at the center of philosophy and yet knowledge of things, “in 
their own right,” is possible. As Cogburn demonstrates, however, “the price 
to pay” for holding both of these positions is “the cost of characterising reality 
as a contradictory whole,” a position that brings Garcia close to that of 
Graham Priest and Paul Livingstone to the extent that these thinkers also give 
an account of the contradictory (Priest) or paradoxical (Livingstone) nature of 
the whole.30   
For all that he is not alone in thinking reality as a contradictory or 
paradoxical whole; the strangeness of Garcia’s project is evident: “to prove 
that it is possible to describe the non-trivial qualities of a world of things 
lacking all qualities. Once the possibility of such a flat world of de-determined 
things is accepted, we must still prove its necessity, or at least its utility.”31 As 
such, we should not let the flatness of Garcia’s ontology of things distract us 
from its value in, one might say, a traditional sense. As noted above, Garcia 
clearly feels that there is “an epidemic of things” and he writes to convince 
people of this feeling; “the goal of this work is to bring those who do not yet 
share this feeling to admit it, and to propose to those who already admit it a 
way of ridding oneself of it.”32 And again: “This treatise is for those of us who 
love things, but who struggle in the face of their accumulation. It aims to put 
a thought to the test: a thought about things rather than a thought about our 
thought about things.”33 For all the strangeness of Form and Object, therefore, 
there is what I shall call a framing diagnostic-therapeutic dialectic organizing 
the discussion, albeit one that begins on the side of “that solitary something 
in each thing that can never be reduced to anything else”34 rather than on the 
side of the ailing subject. Perhaps that “solitary something,” once diagnosed, 
offers up a way of “ridding oneself” of the feeling that there is an “epidemic 
of things”; or, at least, that we can rid ourselves of the feeling that this 
epidemic will infect the whole of humanity? It is one of the startling, and most 
original aspects of his work, that Garcia addresses this diagnostic-therapeutic 
dialectic from the side of things, so to speak. The gamble is that a better, by 
which in this case is meant a flatter, account of things will stop the epidemic. 
Not only does Form and Object offer up a new account of realism, as Cogburn 
eloquently argues,35 it offers up a new way of responding to the seemingly 
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unstoppable rise of things that characterizes capitalist modernity; new, 
because no one prior to Garcia has thought to address this issue from the side 
of the thing. But how does he do this and what is to be gained by such a 
counter-intuitive philosophical gesture? In order to answer these questions, 
we must grasp the problem at the heart of Form and Object. 
 
The Compact: Garcia’s Version of the Problem of 
Possession 
The self-avowed tasks of Form and Object are “a new model of the division 
of things”36 and an “encyclopaedia and topography of the universe and 
objects.”37 The former is driven by the desire for a flat ontology, “in which 
any thing, sensu stricto, is equivalent to another thing”38 and a formal system 
of the negative in order to provide the de-determined thing with its minimum 
definition: “a thing is nothing other than the difference between that which is 
in this thing and that in which this thing is.”39 Therefore, the formal section of 
the book is not a way of sorting things, of ordering or boxing things that we 
may then regain control over them; rather, it is a minimal ontology of the 
internally divided nature of things. The latter encyclopedic task is rather 
different. According to Garcia, “an object is a thing that matters within 
another thing”40 and the task is to categorize and classify “the swarming 
universe” of objects with which we are more familiar: from the universe itself, 
through discussions of animals and humans, to culture, history and values 
and finally to the ages of life, and death. As he says, “the objective system is 
rich in content, in significations, in relations, in novelties, in accumulation, in 
choices, in disciplines, divided and multiplied in every direction, ad 
infinitum.”41 These two tasks – providing an account of a minimal, flat, 
ontology of things and a richly dimensional universe of objects – instill 
Garcia’s project with the necessary tools for both the diagnosis of our 
“epidemic of things” and the therapeutic tools to consider what is at stake if 
we want to consider a life after possession. 
Recalling that we humans are also things – that we are not only things 
that think but that our thought about things is also a thing – means that we 
too are internally divided, that we can only be defined, in a strict sense, as that 
difference between that which is in us and that in which we are. Moreover, as 
we are also objects in the sense that we are composed of things that matter in 
other things, so we can also be considered as members of the universe of 
objects that is “rich in content.” But what is the critical import of these two 
claims? We have long since got used to the idea that human beings are divided 
within themselves and that in many respects our internal division is the result 
of our deep submersion within a world of things; at least to the extent that we 
have taken on board the insights of the philosophers of suspicion. What is 
innovative and controversial in Garcia’s position, however, is twofold. First, 
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that our “thingly” nature means that the epidemic of things can be diagnosed 
in a direct way; “the formal plane of thought enables us to cut short all 
epistemic, experiential, or enacted accumulation through simplicity.”42 
Secondly, that there is no hope for the resolution of our submersion in the 
world of things that can be rooted in our subjective capacity to possess 
ourselves. Nothing in the richly textured universe of objects – things in things 
– can be found that will overcome the internally divided nature of things: be 
it, science, culture, spirit or philosophy itself. The universe of objects will not 
save us from the epidemic of things. According to Garcia, if we can and must 
consider ourselves to be things in order to avoid an ontological framework 
structured by unwarranted hierarchies and if things are defined by their lack 
of self-possession, then we can no longer be considered as beings capable of 
self-possession. The upshot is that any potential subjective resolution of the 
problem brought about by the epidemic of things can only be a chimera. 
This chimerical search for resolution is given the name “compact” by 
Garcia. Unsurprisingly, given his division between a formal account of things 
and an encyclopaedic account of objects, there are two elements to his 
analyses of compactness. On the one hand, there is the claim that nothing can 
be compact “in itself.” On the other hand, there is the claim that compactness 
exists but only as failure. The argument for the first claim is worth quoting at 
length: 
If something is in itself, it is because there is confusion 
between “that which is” and “that which it is,” between 
“that which is in this thing” and “that in which this thing 
is”: “self.” We are left with two possibilities. Either a 
minimal difference exists between the self “which is in” and 
the self “in which it is,” in which case there is not one self 
but two selves. Or no difference exists between the self 
which is in and the self in which it is, in which case there 
cannot be something, since something is defined simply as 
the difference of the “in” between that which is in and that in 
which it is. 
In the first case, two selves exist. In the second case, no 
selves exist. Something in “itself” either comprehends two 
things, or comprehends no thing.43 
In summary, what we think about a thing and what we think about our 
thought about the thing will either create a split self incapable of being a single 
compact self or it will create a sense of self that can not think the very thing 
we are trying to think about. There are echoes of Meillassoux’s critique of 
correlationalism and Harman’s account of object oriented philosophy in this 
argument, though the differences between these positions are every bit as 
important.44 Meillassoux argues through the correlationist circle in order to 
reach a claim that is “after finitude” (we can know something about reality in 
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its own right because we are the beings that think about these things).45 
Harman, in contrast, rejects the idea that we have to go through the 
correlation of thinking and being to access objects, but argues that what we 
come to know about objects will always be finite because “finitude is not just 
a local spectre haunting the human subject, but a structural feature of relations 
in general including non-human ones.”46 In contrast to both, Garcia does not 
think that we need to argue through the correlationist circle – at least we 
should take the chance of thinking that what is “thought, said and known” 
are themselves things – and that we can have unlimited access to the nature 
of things. Whereas Meillassoux’s argument rests upon a positive, affirmative, 
rationalism and intellectualism, Garcia and Harman employ a rationalism of 
the negation, one in which the principle aim is that of de-determining objects. 
However, where Harman’s is a form of negativity framed as constant 
withdrawal, Garcia’s is a dialectical negation of a more open-ended nature. 
Hence Harman’s objects are always withdrawing from themselves, even 
though they do in a sense exist in themselves, whereas Garcia’s things are 
purely formal and in this sense do not exist in themselves at all. For Garcia, 
there is nothing, no thing, that has a compact nature.  
As Cogburn notes, compactness is “perhaps the major antagonist in 
Garcia’s text.”47 I suggest that we follow Garcia and drop the “perhaps”: 
compactness, he says at the outset, “will be the adversary of our whole 
adventure of thought.”48 But why is this lack of equivocation important? The 
answer to this question provides a route back to the second aspect of Garcia’s 
critique of compactness; that it exists but always fails. We can see how this 
works if we ask a simple question: how does Garcia claim to know that the 
formal model of things he proposes has any veracity? Situating Garcia’s 
critique of compactness solely as a response to the idea of the “in itself” risks 
presenting it as simply dogmatic. However, there are key elements to Garcia’s 
project that suggest it should not be read as the simple presentation of a 
dogmatic system. From the opening pages we are invited to put the book 
down if we want to consider the conditions of thought that engender our 
thinking about things: “whoever expects philosophy to teach them about 
knowledge, consciousness, or individual and collective subjectivity more 
broadly, must be forewarned: they may be disappointed.”49 The opening 
gambit, therefore, is to philosophise as if the Kantian epistemological turn had 
never happened. Garcia, however, goes on to develop this into a second claim; 
“our time is plagued by the metaphysics of access.”50 None of the attempts to 
theorise “our methodological access to things”51 get us any closer to thinking 
about the “thingly contamination of the present.”52 More particularly, these 
exercises in transcendental philosophy that define the post-Kantian 
philosophical milieu have, thirdly, hindered our attempts at understanding 
this contamination. If we are to understand how this contamination has taken 
place such that we are suffering from an epidemic of things then we must 
begin with a direct assault on the nature of things so that “we make no 
promises that we cannot keep.”53 All of which adds up to another reason why 
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compactness is so essential for Garcia; it provides a pragmatic response to the 
problem of veracity. The test of the truth or not of his minimal metaphysics of 
things will be the extent to which it is useful in overcoming our objective sense 
of being possessed by things. Challenging, as thoroughly as possible, the idea 
that any thing – traditional things, subjects and our thought about both – 
either is or may become compact in itself motivates the entirety of his response 
to the epidemic of things. That these attempts exist is undeniable, and yet for 
Garcia their existence is marked by failure; “compactness is the presence in 
the world of impossibility, its mode of possibility; failure. Nothing is 
impossible, but some thing (compactness) is possible if and only if it fails – 
and fails in the world.”54 Showing the failure of compact thinking is the main 
aim of the much longer second part of the book, the part that deals with the 
encyclopedia of objects. All of which is reason to think that Garcia’s central 
philosophical claim – there is no thing in itself – is best read as a pragmatic 
and critical contribution to the problem of compactness, the idea that anything 
may possess itself, that defines modernity rather than as a direct riposte to 
Kant or as solely an intervention in the age-old debates between realism and 
idealism.  
Having established this pragmatic and critical reading of compactness at 
the heart of his project, it then makes sense to claim that Form and Object is 
best approached as an anti-Rousseauean treatise. The real targets of the book 
are those who think that there is a manner of collective self-possession that 
will save us from the epidemic of things. As such, Garcia is both the heir to 
McPherson in that he accepts that no individual (thing or person) can be said 
to be truly self-possessed, while he is also a critic of McPherson to the extent 
that he questions the ideal of a form of social compact that can instantiate self-
possession at the level of the collective. Where the socialist McPherson found 
the roots of bourgeois liberalism in the possessive individualism of Hobbes, 
Harrington and Locke, Garcia finds the roots of all claims to self-possession, 
of Right and Left, in the presumption of the compact nature of things. The 
claim about the impossibility of compact things and the existence yet failure 
of compact objects functions as a critical perspective on both the possessive 
individualism so definitive of modernity – that we are what we possess – and 
also as a critical perspective that points to the necessary failure of all attempts 
to overcome neo-liberalism by appeal to our collective self-possession. Pitting 
the internal and interminable gap between that which is in a thing and that 
which a thing is against the social compact of Rousseau, Garcia constructs a 
perspective on the problem of possession that is highly original and 
compelling because it justifies its veracity pragmatically “for those of us who 
love things, but who struggle in the face of their accumulation.”55 Moreover, 
this pragmatism is on the side of things and objects rather than individuals 
and collectives and, to this extent, it offers a route out of the impasses that 
beset the masters of suspicion. But what is this route beyond our cultures of 
possession and consumption and what hope, if any, does it offer if we are 
drawn to the prospect, as Garcia is, of a life after possession? 
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After Possession: The Problem, the Chance and the Price 
In making explicit the critique of possessiveness that guides Garcia’s 
project, both as motivation and as pragmatic justification of his minimal 
metaphysics, I am claiming that it is better to situate Form and Object amongst 
the pantheon of modern critical theory than among the classics of “pure” 
metaphysics. While approaching the problem of possession from the side of 
the thing might seem to rule this out, to the extent that the critical tradition is 
usually defined by subjective reflexivity, it would be a mistake to introduce 
this arbitrary distinction if it blinded us to the force and contemporary 
relevance of Garcia’s appeal to a life after possession.56 It is interesting to note, 
in this regard, that Harman reports that in their first conversation together 
Garcia remarked that his philosophical apprenticeship was shaped by his 
adolescent engagement with the Frankfurt School.57 For all that it is a text that 
Horkheimer and Adorno would barely recognise as critical theory, I have 
sought to make clear that the impact of this tradition is evident from the 
opening sentence of Form and Object: “our time is perhaps the time of an 
epidemic of things.”58 The critical interrogation of “our time” may then 
appear buried underneath the welter of metaphysical claims that define his 
approach to the thing, but for all that, it remains a text that makes its appeal 
to us, now, and that justifies its veracity in terms of how useful or not we find 
his critique of compactness, for us, now.  
Indeed, we can now summarize the critical heart of Form and Object. For 
Garcia, there is nothing, no thing, that possesses itself (ourselves included) 
and, given this, all objects are collections of “things which matter in things” 
that may appear ordered in compact forms but that can, in fact, always be 
reordered differently because of their own internal division and the internal 
division within the things from which they are constituted. This is not only a 
critique of essentialism from the side of the thing rather than the subject, it is 
a critique of both liberal contracts and socialist compacts. Liberal contract 
theory rests upon the possessive individualism so astutely characterized and 
criticized by McPherson, and Garcia can be said to join McPherson in 
undermining the objective forms of politics that follow from this idea of 
compact individualism. Where Garcia’s approach to these matters (that is, 
from the side of the thing) makes a difference is that he is also able to call into 
question the necessary appearance and failure of attempts to challenge 
possessive individualism in the name of a collective subject. In general, then, 
for all that it may seem to be as distant from such concerns as any book could 
be, Garcia’s project is nonetheless a critique of all individualist claims to self-
possession (that which is in a thing) and of all collective claims to the intrinsic 
nature of relations (that in which a thing is) that underpin the hope of collective 
self-possession.  
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There is, nonetheless, a problem in the critical apparatus that animates 
Garcia’s project. As Livingstone puts it, “it is not clear how the overarching 
division between the formal world of things and the objective universe of 
objects itself is to be motivated…despite the detail and insight with which 
Garcia develops the internal characterisation of both domains, he says little 
about how the passage from one to the other is produced or traversed.”59 I 
have given one answer to this problem: Garcia’s discussion is motivated by a 
strong, albeit heterodox, sense of critical intervention in the cultures of 
accumulation and possession that define our current age. Another response, 
which develops the first, is to recognize that all attempts to compact objects – 
such as the individual, collectives, cultures, spirit and so on – do appear to be 
present in our world but only to the extent that they fail because of the 
intrinsically uncompacted nature of things. In this sense, part II of Form and 
Object is methodologically prior to part I: there is no metaphysically proper 
way to move from things to objects, such that we can only de-substantialise 
objects in order to reach a maximally flat ontology of things. But Livingstone’s 
point is rather more cutting. How do objects appear at all, if there are only de-
determined things in our metaphysics of the world? I agree with Livingstone 
when he says that there is no clear account of this given by Garcia. Where I 
would add a different slant to Livingstone’s problem is that this may not 
matter. To back up this claim, however, is to move Form and Object away from 
an interpretive framework that treats it solely as a metaphysical treatise that 
must build its claims from the bottom-up, so to speak. It is more in keeping 
with his project to treat Garcia as aligned to Badiou’s subtractive 
metaontology: our ontological claims are only to be derived by subtracting all 
that is inessential from what is, in this case the objects of the world.60 
Moreover, this interpretive move can also bring us to the final insight that can 
be garnered from Garcia’s text: the chance and price to pay of living after 
possession. 
Methodologically speaking, Garcia must assume that objects are simply 
present and that their presence in the universe can change. In a claim that puts 
him within and yet decisively at odds with the process philosophies of, for 
example, Whitehead and Deleuze, Garcia attributes such change in objects to 
events.61 The sense in which he joins the tradition of process philosophy is 
simply this: he treats the changes within objects as events that give us no 
reason to rest content with their apparent permanence; or compactness, in 
Garcia’s terminology. Where he pits himself directly against such process 
philosophies is in how he treats events. Whereas process philosophies treat 
events as the condition of emergence for that which we encounter in our 
everyday world, Garcia is suspicious of such claims because he argues that 
such approaches can only lead to both a multiplication of emergent things and 
a reduction of those things to one, compact, notion of the event. His task, in 
contrast, is to retain a minimal account of things that does not lead to their 
rapid multiplication but that also avoids their reduction into a mystical sense 
of the event. Now that his notion of the event is brought into view, initially at 
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least, we can see the critical purchase of his minimal ontology: “every 
ontology that privileges events over objects and things, or objects rather than 
things and events, or things to the detriment of objects and events, is 
groundless and systematically leads to compactness.”62 
His approach to avoiding ontologies that lead to compactness is to treat 
events as intensive variations in the presence of objects. Intensification, for 
Garcia, is the moment when the difference between what an object contains 
and that which contains them is changed. Such intensification occurs when 
objects “comprehend” each other. Comprehension is a technical term for 
Garcia that is defined as the sense objects make of each other. As such, objects 
are intensified at the moment of their comprehension, when they make sense 
of each other. There are philosophical conundrums that follow from this 
account of comprehension and intensification.63 For our purposes, though, 
the main point from a critical perspective is that such intensification is the 
moment of extended differentiation between that which is in a thing and that 
in which a thing is. It is, in short, the pulling apart of that which appears 
compact in order to expose its internal differences such that they can be 
reconstituted in new ways. Comprehension as a moment of intensification, 
therefore, is the critical motif that articulates Garcia’s subtractive method 
without instantiating what he would see as a mystical privileging of thing, 
object or event. It is for this reason that we can say his analysis is more than 
an extension of the idea that notions of self-possession are socially 
constructed. For all that the reading of Form and Object developed above 
situates the book within a critical tradition, it is equally clear that there is no 
scope within Garcia's system for an appeal to “social construction” as this 
would require a claim about the compact nature of the social that is anathema 
to his position. It would be more in keeping with his approach to objects to 
claim that the outcome of his challenge to possessiveness leads toward the 
idea that all objects (individuals and collectives) exist within and between 
“overlapping and contradictory classes.”64 However, in itself this claim does 
not fully express the critical dimension of his appeal to comprehension as a 
moment of intensification. Comprehension of our contradictory existence 
requires actively reconstituting the classes to which we belong. But to what 
end?  
Garcia’s critical response to the epidemic of things can now be articulated 
in terms of its purpose: all objects, ourselves included, can become more of 
what they are by intensifying the difference that makes them what they are – 
that is, the difference between what they contain and what they are contained 
within. This intensification, we can now say on the basis of situating Garcia’s 
argument within the modern tradition of the critique of self-possession, is the 
task of living a life without self-possession, or living a life after possession. 
There is a strong existentialist twist to this conclusion: “objective 
accumulation is our condition. We experience existential suffocation from it, 
but it also forms an opening allowing us to take in the world amidst objects.”65 
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In ridding ourselves of the objective determinations of who we are, we are 
able to constitute our life in ways that avoid the dangers of compactness. In 
contrast to the existentialist, however, this life will never be authentic in the 
sense that might reintroduce a concern about a compact notion of identity, at 
either the individual or collective level. Garcia, we might say, is an 
existentialist of the internally divided thing.  The intensive life requires 
resisting the idea that we are already self-possessed individuals and resisting 
the idea that we are individuals defined by our collective existence, thereby 
resisting any over-arching collective definition of who we are as collectively 
possessed beings. It is a call for a life of contradiction, of paradoxes, and a call 
to resist every objective attempt to remove these paradoxes. The price to pay 
for living after possession is the tragedy of never being able to reconcile 
oneself with oneself – but maybe it is a price worth paying given the 
disastrous effects of living under cultural, economic and political regimes 
based on the unsustainable idea of our ability to possess ourselves. A life after 
possession may be worth the price of it being a paradoxical and contradictory 
life. 
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